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THE QUALITEX MONSTER: THE COLOR
TRADEMARK DISASTER'
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, colors were not granted trademark protection
unless combined with a distinctive design.2 In 1985, the Federal
Circuit departed from the majority rule in In re Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp.3 to hold that the corporation could register the
pink color of its insulation as a trademark.4 Thereafter, the
Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Owens-Corning decision in
NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp.5 Although deciding Master Distrib-
utors, Inc. v. Pako Corp.' on another issue, the Eighth Circuit
announced its willingness to follow Owens-Corning. Following the
majority rule among the circuits, the Ninth Circuit, in Qualitex Co.
v. Jacobson Products Co.,7 held in January 1994 that color alone
was not protectible' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve this conflict within the circuits and unanimously reversed
the Ninth Circuit, thus abandoning the traditional rule of no
protection for color alone.'
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Qualitex Company (Qualitex) has manufactured and sold
' See Trademark Rights Given for Colors: High Court Rules Against Valley Firm, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, March 29, 1995 at B1 (stating comment of Jacobson's president, Sidney
Jacobson that "the Supreme Court has created a monster... everyone will be trying to get
a color (trademarked) and it's going to be a mess.").
2 NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1959 (7th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991).
3 774 F.2d 1116, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 417 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "Fiberglas" is a registered
trademark of the Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation, in use since 1936. William J.
Keating, Development of Evidence to Support Color-Based Trademarks, 9 J.L. & COM. 1, 1
n.4 (1989).
" Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128.
5 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991).
6 986 F.2d 219, 224, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1794 (8th Cir. 1993).
7 13 F.3d 1297, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1277 (9th Cir. 1994) rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
s Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1302.
9 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161
(1995).
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"SUN GLOW' press pads for dry cleaning presses since 1957.10
In 1989, Jacobson Products Company, Inc. (Jacobson) began selling
"MAGIC GLOW" press pads dyed the same green-gold color as
those made by Qualitex." Qualitex's press pads have been
prominently advertised in trade publications in color since 1970.12
Additionally, Qualitex distributes materials picturing its green-gold
press pad at trade shows and through mailings.13 Until Jacobson
introduced its "MAGIC GLOW" press pads, no company other than
Qualitex made green-gold press pads, although other press pads
were sold in a variety of colors.14
Press pads function as padding on machines that press clothes in
the dry cleaning and garment manufacturing industries. 5 An
outer layer of cloth treated to resist heat covers the padding, which
is made from fiberglass, rubber, and insulating materials. 6
During the pressing process, the pads become scorched and are
"rendered unsightly if color is not present to mute or disguise the
inevitable scorch marks." 7 Thus, "[t]here is a competitive need
in the press pad industry for color.""
Qualitex brought suit against Jacobson for trademark infringe-
ment and for unfair competition in violation of § 43 of the Lanham
Act, seeking both an injunction and damages.' 9 In 1991, while the
suit was pending, the Patent and Trademark Office granted
10 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995).
'Id.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
"No other advertiser ever ran an ad with that color" in American Drycleaner Magazine, the
leading trade publication. Id.
"I Id. "Qualitex also drapes its booths at trade shows with green-gold cover material. Id.
14 Id. Jacobson has sold dark green and two-tone grey and green press pads since 1988.
Id.
" Junda Woo, Product's Color Alone Can't Get Trademark Protection, Court Says, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 5, 1994, at B8.
16 Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1457.
"Appellee's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1577).
"' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1991)
(finding that number of available colors was "in the hundreds, if not thousands").
"9 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995). Qualitex sought damages for Jacobson's profits from the sale of "MAGIC
GLOW" press pads and an injunction against their further manufacture and marketing. Id.
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THE QUALITEX MONSTER
registration of Qualitex's green-gold color.20 The District Court for
the Central District of California held that Jacobson was guilty of
trademark infringement and unfair competition and granted the
injunction and awarded damages to Qualitex.21
Jacobson counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that Qualitex's
trademark was invalid, arguing that color alone cannot be protect-
ed.22 The district court held that the existence of a registered
trademark is "prima facie evidence" of validity and determined that
Jacobson failed to prove that the mark was invalid.2'
The Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed the district court's
finding that Jacobson was guilty of trademark infringement and
held that color alone could not receive trademark protection.24
Since the trademark for color was found invalid, the Ninth Circuit
directed the district court to enter judgment cancelling the
trademark.' In addition, the court affirmed the judgment of
unfair competition for Qualitex, the award of monetary damages for
the unfair competition claim and the injunction against Jacob-
son.
26
III. BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICABLE LAw
A. TRADITIONAL RULE PROHIBITING PROTECTION OF COLOR ALONE
The majority of courts have held that color alone was not
protectible.2 ' Three major reasons have been given to deny
20 Id. Qualitex's registration was issued February 5, 1991 as No. 1,633,711. Id.211d. Jacobson was ordered to pay $82,013.13 plus costs to Qualitex. Also, Jacobson and
its agents were "permanently enjoined from manufacturing, marketing or selling press pads"
in the same green-gold color or any closely similar shade. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1462.
' Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995).
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
2 Id. at 1305.
2Id.
" See, e.g., id. at 1302 (listing rules in the courts of appeals); NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt
Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991) (noting general
rule barred trademark protection for color); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADE-
MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.16(1) (3d ed. 1993) (stating that only Eighth Circuit
follows Federal Circuit's holding "that the overall color of a product was not precluded from
1995] 597
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trademark protection for color alone: the color depletion theory,'
the shade confusion theory,' and the functionality doctrine.3"
The color depletion theory rests on the assumption that a limited
number of possible colors exist, and if manufacturers can monopo-
lize colors for a product, the "list of colors will soon run out."31 It
was understood originally that registration of a color would
encompass all of its shades; thus, monopolization of a primary color
has been prohibited for almost ninety years.32 Modern courts
have applied the color depletion theory to bar protection for one
shade of a color.'
Additionally, the available color palette for some products is quite
restricted due to the nature of the product itself.' In R.L. Win-
ston Rod Co. v. Sage Manufacturing Co.,' only a few colors were
shown to cover successfully black graphite fishing rods and the
court held that allowing one company to monopolize green would
"severely restrict competition." 6 In these industries, there is a
"competitive need" for color and even under a rule allowing color
trademarks, protection would be denied.37
The color depletion theory has been criticized because thousands
registration as a trademark.").
Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798, 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430 (3d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949) (originating color depletion theory to deny protection
of red and white soup can labels).
NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 983 (1991).
' Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 733, 114 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 434 (3d Cir. 1957) (holding blue dot on photographic flashbulbs to be functional in
utilitarian sense); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
252 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affdper curiam, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding color of front-end
loaders to be aesthetically functional).
s' Campbell Soup, 175 F.2d at 798.
' Diamond Match Co. v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1906), ert denied,
203 U.S. 589 (1906); Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949).
' See First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382-83, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1779 (9th Cir. 1987) (denying protection of color yellow for antifreeze bottles).
" R.L. Winston Rod Co. v. Sage Mfg. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1396, 1400, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1779 (D. Mont. 1993).
s5Id.
Id. at 1400.
27 774 F.2d at 1121-22 (finding no competitive need for color in fiberglass industry and
holding color pink protectible).
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of shades exist through modem technology.' However, others
have noted that most consumers are unable to identify between
products colored with different shades of the same primary color;
thus, the existence of almost infinite shades of colors does not
warrant trademark registration of colors.39
A similar argument against protecting color per se is the shade
confusion theory. Under this theory, the contention is that
litigation over trademarks would become focused on whether the
colors were genuinely different.40 Proponents of shade confusion
theory argue that courts would face difficulties in distinguishing
between colors, particularly because registrations of marks do not
contain color samples.41
However, courts had to make these shade determinations even in
jurisdictions that barred protection of mere color, thus weakening
the shade confusion theory.42 In addition, even if consumers
cannot identify different shades, courts can employ scientific
evidence to precisely differentiate colors.43 Moreover, courts
already distinguish between other marks, such as words, which
require more problematic inquiries."
A final argument traditionally given to deny protection rested on
functionality. Under the functionality doctrine, features, such as
color, cannot be protected if they are functional.45 The functional-
'Master Distrib., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 223, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1794 (8th
Cir. 1993).
soE.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7.16(1) (arguing that it is "naive view" to assume
"fine variations in shade" will be distinguishable); Craig Summerfield, Note, Color as a
Trademark and the Mere Color Rule: The Circuit Split for Color Alone, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
973, 996 (1993) ("merely listing the number of colors... provides little insight").
' NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 983 (1991); In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(Bissell, J., dissenting).
4137 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1994) (requiring submission of drawing with trademark application
with colors indicated by patterns of lines). Note that only eight line patterns are available
and four of these patterns can each represent two colors.
' E.g., Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1993) ("questions
regarding shade confusion are already being answered"); MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7.16(1)
("even under the present state of the law, such questions will still arise to a limited extent").
' McCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7.16(1).
"In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
"Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1530, 1533, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that color black of outboard motors was functional
because it was compatible in color with boats and made motor appear smaller in size), cert.
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ity doctrine was derived judicially to prevent one manufacturer
from having a monopoly over "an advance in effectiveness of
operation, or in simplicity of form, or in utility of color.' The
functionality doctrine outweighs the manufacturer's "right to
protect symbols which identify the source of particular goods"
because protecting functional features, including color, would deter
or eliminate competition.47
The United States Supreme Court has said that "a product
feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the
article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."' All the
circuits recognize the doctrine of utilitarian functionality, but define
functionality in different ways.49 If protecting a product feature,
such as color, would "hinder competition"" because it would be
costly for other manufacturers "to design around or do without,"
then that feature is functional and cannot be protected.5'
Some of the circuits also recognize aesthetic functionality as a
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995).
46 Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979, 982 (7th Cir.
1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912); see Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co.,
247 F.2d 730, 732 (3d Cir. 1957) (stating that functionality doctrine "preventis] the grant of
perpetual monopoly by the issuance of a trade-mark in the situation where a patent has
either expired, or for one reason or another, cannot be granted").
4'Brunswick Corp., 35 F.3d at 1530 (discussing In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671
F.2d 1332,1337,213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 9 (C.C.P.. 1982)); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. a (1995) (stating that functionality doctrine prevents "anticompetitive
consequences" of exclusive rights).
' Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1
(1982); see Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (holding that shape of
product was functional because its cost would increase and its quality decrease if another
shape had to be used instead).
49 McCARTHy, supra note 27, § 7.26[3][a] (noting that "[m]any agree that the 'ultimate
question' is whether the copier is able to 'compete effectively' without copying" the first
product's feature).
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. a (1995); see Sylvania Elec.
Prod., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957) (holding that chemical air
leakage indicator on photographic flashbulbs which changed color to indicate leak was
functional as color is necessary for its purpose).
"' Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1189, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (7th Cir. 1989); see Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 518 F.
Supp. 607, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 842 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (finding black tread of stepladder
functional because dirt does not show on black), affd 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982); Brunswick
Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 1532-33 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that color black
was functional because it "suppl[ied] a competitive advantage"), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W.
3487 (1995).
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means of finding color functional.52 In Deere & Co. v. Farmhand,
Inc., the color John Deere green was held to be functional for
farm equipment because "farmers prefer to match their loaders to
their tractor" and protection of the color would harm competi-
tion." If the color of a product is a significant element of its
success, even if for purely aesthetic reasons, the color should also
be available for imitation by competitors.65
B. IN RE OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLASS CORP.: DEPARTURE FROM THE
TRADITIONAL RULE
In 1985, a divided Federal Circuit held that the Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corporation (Owens-Coming) was entitled to registration
of the color pink in manufacturing fiberglass insulation.' The
court found that the color pink was not functional and had acquired
secondary meaning, and thus could be protected. 57 This decision
marked the first time a color alone received trademark protec-
tion.' Only one other circuit treated the Owens-Corning decision
with approval. 9
The Federal Circuit noted that the Lanham Act provided for a
MCCARTHY, supra, note 27, § 7.26[4][b] (noting that many circuits reject or limit
doctrine); see First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)
(stating that "the 'aesthetic' functionality test has been limited... in favor of the 'utilitarian'
functionality test" in the Ninth Circuit).
" 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affd per curiam, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
5Id. at 98.
Id. ("The doctrine of aesthetic functionality defines functionality in terms of consumer
acceptance."); e.g., R.L. Winston Rod Co. v. Sage Mfg. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D. Mont.
1993) (finding consumers preferred color of their fly rods to "evoke the natural colors of the
outdoor environment in which they are used," thus green, black, and brown are functional);
Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 518 F. Supp. 607, 617 (E.D. Mo.
1981) (finding that both manufacturers chose color almond because "it was the most popular
color for kitchen accessories"), affd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982).
"In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board had held that "[a]nalysis of color trademarks should...
be subject to the same analysis as any other sort of ornamentation," but Owens-Corning had
not shown that "pink functions as a trademark for... insulation." 221 U.S.P.Q. 1195, 1198-
99 (T.T.AB. 1984).
'T Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1122.
MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7.16(2].
Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993); McCARTHY,
supra note 27, § 7.16[2].
7
Overcamp: The Qualitex Monster: The Color Trademark Disaster
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1995
J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 2:595
broad policy of granting trademarks unless an express exception
covers the type of mark.' The court emphasized that no excep-
tion is given for color and that analogous protection now exists for
other "previously excluded indicia," such as product configurations,
slogans, and sounds. 61 The Federal Circuit found that color mark
cases are decided on a case-by-case basis consistent with the intent
of Congress in enacting the Lanham Act.
6 2
The Federal Circuit discounted or diluted the customary argu-
ments against protection of color alone. First, the court stated that
the color depletion theory is no longer applicable as a "per se
prohibition" on the protection of color marks after the enactment of
the Lanham Act.' However, the examples the court cited in
support of its proposition are concerned with protection for color as
part of a design, not for color alone."' Since "each case is decided
upon its facts," the color depletion theory cannot bar all protection
of color, but the court left open the possibility that the theory could
be applied in appropriate situations.6
Second, the court reaffirmed the rule that "when the color applied
to goods serves a primarily utilitarian purpose it is not subject to
protection as a trademark.' 6 If a color is found to be functional,
it cannot be protected because to do so would eliminate competi-
tion.6 7 The question of functionality was not raised in opposition
to registration, but Owens-Coming was the only manufacturer to
apply any color to insulation; thus, pink did not appear to be
"Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119; 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988) ("No trademark by which
the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration .... ").
a' Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1119-1120.
2 Id. at 1120.63 1d. (finding color depletion theory to be "in conflict with the liberating purposes of the
Act.).
" Id.; see, e.g., In re Hehr Mfg. Co, 279 F.2d 526, 528, 126 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381 (C.C.P.A.
1960) (allowing registration of square red label); In re Data Packaging Corp., 453 F.2d 1300,
172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 386 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (granting registration of colored band on contrasting
computer tape reel).
"In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see First
Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "Owens-
Coming continues to apply the color depletion theory unless there is no competitive need for
the color in a particular industry").
"Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1120-21.
07 Id. at 1121.
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functional and other manufacturers had no "competitive need" for
the color pink."
The Federal Circuit also rejected the shade confusion theory as
a reason to prohibit protection for color marks.69 The court agreed
with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that courts already
make harder and more confusing determinations based on distinc-
tions between word marks.7 The court noted that previous cases
have drawn distinctions between shades. However, in support of
this proposition, the court cited a comparison between a dual-
colored product and a product colored in only one shade.71
Having found that there was no competitive need for the color
pink, the court then considered whether the color pink had
acquired secondary meaning.72 The court held that due to the
large amount of money spent on advertising pink insulation, the
color pink had obtained secondary meaning.73 The Lanham Act
provides that a mark "which has become distinctive of applicant's
goods in commerce" can be registered.74 In order to demonstrate
secondary meaning, the court required evidence of the "method of
using the mark" and effectiveness of that method in "caus[ing] the
purchasing public to identify the mark with the source of the
product."7"
The court acknowledged that "[b]y their nature color marks carry
a difficult burden in demonstrating distinctiveness and trademark
character," but found that Owens-Coming presented enough
evidence to be granted registration.76 The corporation demonstrat-
Id. at 1121-22; see also Summerfield, supra note 39, at 975 (-The Owens-Corning court
established a 'competitive need' test for granting rights in color alone.").
" Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1123.70 In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
71 Id (citing Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
162 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (comparing grey and orange banded fence post and orange banded pipe)).
7 Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124.
73 ld. at 1127.
74 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (Supp V. 1993); Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1124 (stating that
Lanham Act 'codiflies] the common-law doctrine of secondary meaning).
"' In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988) (stating that "proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use...
for the five years" prior could be "prima facie evidence that the mark has become
distinctive").
'a Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1127-28. The court also noted that an increased level of
evidence was needed to find ornamentation, such as color, distinctive. Id. at 1124.
1995] 603
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ed that from 1972 to 1981 it spent over forty-two million dollars in
advertising its pink insulation and it presented surveys showing
that fifty percent of homeowners knew that Owens-Coming
Corporation made pink insulation.77 Since "[t]he size of advertis-
ing expenditures alone has been found to serve as strong evidence
of secondary meaning," the court found that Owens-Coming
established secondary meaning of the color pink.78
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that Owens-Coming was allowed
to register the color pink because it was not functional, there was
no competitive need for pink in the insulation market, and it had
acquired secondary meaning.79
Judge Bissell dissented from the majority in Owens-Corning,
arguing that the traditional prohibition against trademarks for
color alone should remain as law.' Although the majority
discussed whether color could receive trademark protection, the
dissent stated that the single issue litigated was whether secondary
meaning had been demonstrated."1 The dissent took issue with
the majority's position that the passage of the Lanham Act caused
courts to abandon the traditional rule, noting that numerous
decisions had continued to prohibit protection of color alone. 2
7 Id. at 1125, 1127. The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board noted that these survey
results do "not establish that those respondents associate pink insulation with a single
source..." 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1195, 1199 (T.T.A.B. 1984).
78 Id. at 1125 (quoting Roux Lab., Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823, 831 n.10, 166
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34, 41 n.10 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
"' Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122, 1128; Thomas A. Schmidt, Creating Protectible Color
Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 285, 301 (1991).
80 In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell, J.,
dissenting); Keating, supra note 3, at 12-13 ("While dissenting opinions frequently have
limited precedential value, a strong dissenting opinion in the federal Circuit is analogous to
a five to four decision in the United States Supreme Court" because the court "has such a
concentrated scope of subject matter jurisdiction.").
8' Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128 n.1.
82Id. at 1128-1129; e.g., Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161, 195
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that color alone cannot be protected); Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 374, 201 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (refusing to allow trademark for color alone), afld, 604 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1979); Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 847 (1949) (rejecting trademark protection for red and white soup labels);
North Shore Lab. Corp. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 523, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 17 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating majority rule denying protection for color); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 480, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 611 (5th Cir. 1974) (refusing to grant rights
in color blue); Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 9, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 440
604
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The dissent gave four reasons why the majority's position in
rejecting the traditional rule was in error.m First, the majority
opinion "ignore[d] the principle of comity.""4 The Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction over trademark law is not exclusive, but is shared with
the regional circuits.8 Although the decisions of other circuits do
not bind the Federal Circuit, the dissent declared, "they are
entitled to at least a modicum of respect and deference," particular-
ly since their jurisdiction is concurrent.' The majority's decision
rejected the ideals of predictability and consistency and encouraged
forum-shopping.
8 7
Second, the majority's rejection of the traditional rule was
unnecessary since other protections within the Lanham Act serve
to protect color when it is an element in a trademark." Courts
have long held that a color combined with "an arbitrary or distinc-
tive design" can be protected. 9 The dissent concluded that the
color pink was not an element of a design, but rather the overall
color of the insulation, and therefore not protectible under the
traditional rule.'
(7th Cir. 1950) (denying protection in color of product); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560
F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (refusing to grant trademark in color green on farm machinery),
affd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983); Mershon Co. v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879, 883, 105
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4 (9th Cir. 1955) (holding that color alone is not protectible), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 885 (1955); In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950, 955, 106 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 286 (C.C.P.A.
1955) (recognizing traditional bar to protecting color alone).
Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1129.
Id.
MId. "Even if we had exclusive jurisdiction over trademark law, we should not lightly
cast aside a settled interpretation of a statute." Id.
"*In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell, J.,
dissenting).87 Id. (arguing that other circuits will not recognize Owens-Corning's registration).
88 Id. at 1130; Keating, supra note 3, at 13 (declaring "argument is weak because if color
may be recognized as an element of a trademark, it should also be recognized as a
registerable trademark where in fact it fulfills that function').
'* Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1130; see, e.g., In re Hehr Mfg. Co., 279 F.2d 526, 528
(C.C.P.A. 1960) (allowing protection for red square label); Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano
Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161 (1st Cir. 1977) (protecting yellow oval design); Campbell Soup
Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949) (holding red and white design was
protectible); Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 9 (7th Cir. 1950) (protecting
multicolor striped label).
" Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1130 (citing two cases purporting to protect color as overall
surface design, note however color is only element of surface designs of products in decisions;
e.g., In re Todd Co., 290 F.2d 597, 600, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 408 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (registering
11
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Third, the dissent determined that the decision "create[d] a
barrier to otherwise lawful competition in the home insulation
trade."' Judge Bissell noted that Owens-Corning was the only
manufacturer that colored its insulation and "its advertising
claim[ed] a 75 percent market share," making Owens-Corning's
pink insulation "virtually synonymous with home insulation.9
2
As a result of Owens-Corning's registration of such a well-adver-
tised product, "new entrants may be unable to effectively compete
if barred from making pink insulation."93
The dissent stated the purpose of trademark law is to grant "the
right to prevent confusion, but not to bar new entrants into the
market.94 Judge Bissell argued that when trademark protection
is not available, manufacturers can be required to label their
products "to prevent customers from being misled as to the
source."95  Therefore, Owens-Corning might have other relief
available without the court granting a monopoly in the color
pink.'
The dissent's final attack on the majority's rejection of the
traditional rule was grounded in a fear that "infringement actions
could soon denigrate into questions of shade confusion."9 7  The
dissent argued that confusion between shades of colors would
pattern of green parallel lines on safety paper products); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young
Enter., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 775, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 85 (9th Cir. 1981) (protecting overall
pattern of florets and letters).
9"In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell, J.,
dissenting).
2Id.; "Whether or not competitors make a practice of dying their products should have
no bearing in the functionality of a particular color chosen by one party to color its product."
Brian Richard Henry, Right Hat, Wrong Peg: In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation
and the Demise of the Mere Color Rule, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 389, 399 (1986).
Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1130. "[T]he record reveals that Owens-Coming dominates
the field to such an extent that 'some shoppers will no longer buy fiberglass insulation unless
it is pink.'" Id.
"Id
Id. (quoting Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
524, 528 (1964)).
"In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell J.,
dissenting) ("However, even under the doctrine of unfair competition, there may be a
legitimate purpose to consumers which is served by a competitor producing a product of the
same color' (citing Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 858 (1982))).
9Owens-Coming, 774 F.2d at 1131.
606 [Vol. 2:595
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present practical problems." Since registrations are not printed
in color and show colors by one of eight patterns of lines with some
patterns representing more than one color, the dissent feared that
"registration will add only greater imprecision."99
Then, in Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp.,'°° the Eighth
Circuit approved of the Owens-Corning majority but refused to
"establish a per se prohibition against protecting color alone as a
trademark." 0' However, since the case was on appeal from a
grant of summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit did not hold
conclusively that Master Distributors was entitled to protection of
the color blue."° According to the Eighth Circuit, a showing that
all "the normal trademark requirements" had been met would be
sufficient to establish a common-law color mark.'0 3
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN
QUALITEX CO. V. JACOBSON PRODUCTS Co.10 4
In Qualitex, the Ninth Circuit unanimously followed the tradi-
tional rule that color per se is not protectible.'0 5 The court based
its decision on the language of the Lanham Act, Ninth Circuit
precedent, and arguments given for the denial of color protection
in other circuits.
The court first looked at the language of the Lanham Act. The
Lanham Act does not expressly prohibit trademark registration of
" Id. (citing Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), affd, 721
F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983)).
9Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131; 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(e) (1994); cf In re Hodes-Lange
Corp., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (stating that it is "of no consequence here that
the Patent Office has designated the same lining for officially indicating both the colors
yellow and gold").
100 986 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1993). Master Distributors brought suit for infringement of its
common-law trademark in the blue color of its leader splicing tape for use in photopro-
cessing. Id& at 220.
101 Master Distribs., 986 F.2d at 224.102 Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of partial summary judgment and remanded
to the district court to further consider whether the color blue could be protected. Id. at 225.
'03 Id. "Although the court did not specifically specify what these normal requirements
are, it mentioned functionality, likelihood of confusion, and secondary meaning were
appropriate tests.' Richard L. Bridge, Note, Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corporation:
Equal Trademark Protection for Color Per Se, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 485, 510 (1993-94).
104 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994), reu'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
106 Id. at 1302 (choosing not to adopt "exception of Owens-Corning").
19951 607
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color.1' 6 The statute provides that "[n]o trademark by which the
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of
others shall be refused registration" unless one of the listed
exceptions is applicable. °7 Although none of the statute's express
exceptions mention the color of the product, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the majority rule in the circuit courts was to deny registra-
tion.1°'
Next, the court looked at its own prior decision on trademark
protection of color. In First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,' °9
the Ninth Circuit distinguished Owens-Corning, stating that the
Federal Circuit, "[c]onfronted with an unusual set of facts... [had]
established a very limited rule that in certain situations a particu-
lar color could itself be registered as a trademark." 1" The court
emphasized that "vast sums had been expended in advertising" on
the color of the product."' The Ninth Circuit downplayed the
case's persuasive value by noting that the Federal Circuit was
divided in its decision.
112
Relying heavily on NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp." 3 to discuss
the detrimental effects of color protection, the court found merit in
the shade confusion and harm to competition arguments."4 The
"fact-driven standard" that would result from granting monopolies
in certain shades on particular products would lead to increased
time litigating infringement cases." 5 Furthermore, courts would
be forced to engage in speculative questions over the probabilities
of future competition. 6
Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that other protections exist for
manufacturers; and, therefore, registration of a color alone would
106 Id. at 1301 (citing Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp V. 1993)).
'o7 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp V. 1993).
106 Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1301.
109 809 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1987).
10 First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1382.
. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995).
1 Id. (noting 2-1 vote).
113 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991).
114 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995) (discussing reasoning of NutraSweet Co.).
115 Id.
le Id.
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not be permitted."'7 For example, trademark protection has been
available for products with distinctive patterns or logos that are
combined with colors.11 Additionally, manufacturers can still
receive relief under the unfair competition and trade dress
provisions of the Lanham Act." 9 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
held that Qualitex succeeded on the unfair competition claim and
could thus receive damages.120
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN
QUALITEX Co. V. JACOBSON PRODUCTS Co. 121
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in Qualitex and
held that when a color "meet[s] ordinary legal trademark require-
ments ... no special rule prevents color alone from serving as a
trademark."2 2  Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous court,
considered the language of the Lanham Act and the principles of
trademark law to find that color alone can be protectible."
The Court stated that under the Lanham Act a mark must act as
a symbol, have acquired secondary meaning, and perform no other
nontrademark function.124 Justice Breyer found that the Lanham
Act's provision for trademark protection for any "symbol, or device"
also encompassed trademark protection for colors." He noted
that since trademarks have been granted for particular shapes,
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995).
1
'
2 Id. at 1305.
121 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
'
2
2 Id. at 1302.123 1&
"A Id. at 1302-04.
Id. at 1302-03; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides:
The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof-(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a
bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to use in commerce
and applies to register on the principal register established by this
chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.
15
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sounds, and scents, that colors ought to receive similar protec-
tion. 1
26
The Court also found that a color can develop secondary meaning
in the same way that a descriptive word can "indicate a product's
origin."127  If a color, after time, "identifies and distinguishes a
particular brand," then it has acquired secondary meaning.
121
Justice Breyer emphasized that a color must identify the source of
the product in order to warrant trademark protection."2
Also, a color that does not perform a "significant nontrademark
function" would be protectible. 130  If a color acts to make "a
product more desirable," then it cannot receive trademark protec-
tion because the color would then be "essential to the use or
purpose of the article or ... affect the cost or quality" of the
product. 131
The district court had found, and the Ninth Circuit had accepted,
that the green-gold color met the trademark requirements of acting
as a symbol, identifying the product's source, and serving no other
function. 132 Therefore, the Court concluded that Qualitex's color
would be able to be protected.13' However, the Court did not hold
that all colors meeting the basic trademark requirements would be
granted registration. Instead, the Court stated that if there is a
"reason that convincingly militates against the use of color alone as
a trademark," then no protection would be given.1
34
The Court then considered and rejected four reasons offered by
'2 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995) ("The courts and the
Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as a mark a particular shape (of a
Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound (of NBC's three chimes), and even a particular scent
(of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread).").
1v Id.1
' Id.
12 Id.
13 0 Id. at 1306.
1 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1306 (1995) (quoting Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)).
" Id. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1457, 1458-60 (C.D.
Cal. 1991) (finding secondary meaning, likelihood of confusion, and nonfinctionality);
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300
(1995) (stating findings of fact).
" Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305 (1995).
14 Id.
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Jacobson for denial of trademark protection for color.1"5 First,
Jacobson argued that allowing protection for color would produce
problems of shade confusion.'36 It asserted that the difficulties
in determining whether similar shades are likely to confuse
consumers will be compounded by differences in lighting condi-
tions. 137 Justice Breyer dismissed this concern stating that courts
can decide whether similar words cause confusion and therefore can
make these determinations between shades as well." He then
noted that typically "'strong ' marks, with greater secondary
meaning, receive broader protection than 'weak' marks."'39
Second, Jacobson offered the color depletion argument in support
of the traditional bar against color trademarks.140 The Court
quickly rejected the color depletion theory as "an occasional
problem" that normally would be resolved by the functionality
doctrine.' In addition, Justice Breyer believed that other colors
usually would be available for manufacturers to use.14
2
Third, Jacobson argued that the majority of courts have refused
to grant trademark protection for color alone, but the Court noted
that all of the cited Supreme Court precedents were decided before
the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946.143 In 1985, in the case
of In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the Federal Circuit
interpreted the Lanham Act to allow trademark protection for color
alone.' 44 Also, the Court relied upon the Patent and Trademark
Office's explicit policy permitting colors as trademarks." The
Court found that when Congress amended the Lanham Act in 1988,
it intended to allow trademark protection for color because of the
135 Id,
137 Id.
13 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305 (1995).
13 Id. (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 11.25(c)). However, this proposition is
irrelevant because shade differences are not determined by the level of secondary meaning
that each shade has attained.140 Id.
1 Id. at 1306.
142 Id&
14 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1307 (1995).
144 Id.
146 Id. See U.S. COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE 1202-13 (2d ed. 1993) (finding that trademarks for color can be
granted, but "[t]he burden of proof in such a case is substantial").
6111995]
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United States Trademark Association's express recommendation
that registration of color trademarks be included within the reach
of the Lanham Act.' 46
In its final argument, Jacobson noted that there are workable
alternatives to a rule that color is protectible. 147  Specifically,
manufacturers may use color as part of a design and can bring
action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act for unfair competition. 148
Justice Breyer responded that some products are "normally see[n]
from a distance," and thus, manufacturers can use only a pure color
to distinguish their products. 149 Finally, the Court noted that
trademark law provides protections that are lacking under unfair
competition laws." °
VI. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court properly granted certiorari in the case of
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. because the current law
regarding the availability and enforceability of trademark protec-
tion for color alone was inconsistent throughout the circuits.' 5'
The Court, however, erred in holding that color alone could be
granted trademark protection. The Ninth Circuit's judgment
should have been upheld because manufacturers can obtain relief
by other means when their products are copied.'52 In addition,
'48 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307; 133 CONG. REC. 32,812 (1987) (stating that bill was
"based on the Commission's report"); see The United States Trademark Association
Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board
of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 421 (1987) (recommending that "the terms 'symbol or
device' should not be deleted or narrowed to preclude registration of such things as a color
... which functions as a mark").
147 Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
1" Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1308 (1995).
149 Id.
150 Id.
15 See Jeffrey M. Samuels and Linda B. Samuels, Color Trademarks: Shades of
Confusion, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 554, 570 (1993) (arguing that registration for color alone
granted by Federal Circuit would not be enforced in other circuits, "creat[ing] a legal
anomaly which should not be allowed to persist.").
152 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115
S. Ct. 1300 (1995) (discussing protection of colors combined with designs and unfair
competition provisions of Lanham Act); NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that traditional rule does not need to be changed), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 983 (1991).
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although the Court dismissed color depletion and shade confusion
as being "unpersuasive," these theories present practical concerns
that may result in a reduction of judicial efficiency." Also, color
serves the function of psychologically attracting consumers to a
product and thus should not be trademarked.' Finally, due to
the American emphasis on free competition, manufacturers should
not acquire exclusive rights in colors alone."
Under the traditional rule, manufacturers were not forced
helplessly to watch other companies copy the colors of their
products. Two methods existed for manufacturers to pursue relief:
(1) combination of color with a distinctive pattern or design, and (2)
unfair competition claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 56
Either option provides the manufacturer with protection, while
neither eliminates competition.
When color is considered along with a unique design or logo,
courts have liberally granted protection.'57 "The more distinctive
and arbitrary the design upon which a color is imposed," the more
'63 NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1028; Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1131 (Bissell, J.,
dissenting).
1' See Louis CHESKIN, COLORS-WHAT THEY CAN DO FOR You 213 (discussing
psychological effects of color).1 See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 1.01(1).
'5 Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1302; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Supp. 1995) states:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
tion of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his
or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
157 E.g., Bridge, supra note 103, at 494 ("As much as the courts denied protection to color
alone, courts granted protection to colors when used ... as part of an arbitrary design.").
19
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likely that trademark protection will be found.' Protection of
color and arbitrary designs in combination does not deter competi-
tion as much as granting exclusive rights in a color alone.15' 9
The Court dismissed this alternative because manufacturers
"might find it difficult to place a usable symbol or word on a
product.""s Although this point may be relevant in some cases,
it is not persuasive enough to justify a rule that severely limits
competition. Producers of generic brands have been able to
compete using similar colors as long as they refrain from using the
distinctive design of the name brand. The Court's grant of
trademark protection for color alone, however, significantly restricts
the ability of such manufacturers to compete."' 1
Also, as the Ninth Circuit ruled in Qualitex, a manufacturer can
be held liable for unfair competition or trade dress infringement
even when the color is not registered." 2 To succeed on such a
claim, the manufacturer must show that the product's "trade dress
is nonfunctional," that "it has acquired secondary meaning," and
that "there is a likelihood of confusion between the products."' 63
Since trade dress is composed of "the total impression of the
package, size, shape, color, design, and name," trade dress infringe-
ment claims do not harm competition to the same extent as
granting exclusive protection in only the color of a product. 6'
The Supreme Court pointed out that manufacturers would prefer
trademarks to "trade dress" protection. 6 ' While it is true that
trademark law provides greater protection, it sets a dangerous
" McCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7.17.
'wE.g., Bridge, supra note 103, at 494 (arguing that "possibility of color combinations and
designs is limitless in contrast to color alone and therefore protection is less likely to hinder
competition").
1SO Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1308 (1995).
'6' See Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court Says a Distinctive Color Can Be Basis for a
Product Trademark, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1995, at B10 (stating decision is 'a defeat for
makers of generic brands"); David G. Savage, High Court Rules Color of Money Can Be
Pepto-Bismol Pink, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at D1 (calling decision 'a setback for store-
brand products that often imitate the basic look, including the color of the leading brands").
16 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995).
'
63 Id. at 1303.
164 Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
affd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963); Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1303-04.
168 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1308 (1995).
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precedent for extending the bounds of trademark law to limit
competition.
A second reason for adhering to the traditional rule relies upon
the color depletion and shade confusion theories. Even with
current technology, color depletion and shade confusion are valid
reasons to prohibit registration of colors alone, due to the resulting
practical problems of trademarking colors.' When different
shades of products are indistinguishable to the human eye, the
consumer becomes confused and the function of trademark as a
method for protecting the public from confusion is not served.1 67
The Court analogized distinctions between shades of colors to
distinctions between words and concluded that courts will be
capable of easily determining differences in colors.1  Justice
Breyer asserted that "[legal standards exist to guide courts," but
beyond mentioning degrees of secondary meaning, which are
irrelevant to distinguishing between shades, he gave no clarifica-
tion as to what those standards are. 169 Trademark registrations
do not contain specific details of the color of a product, leaving
courts with little information to distinguish between imperceptibly
different shades.170
Increasingly, courts will be forced to determine more shade
confusion questions. 71 Further, the Court stated that courts can
replicate "lighting conditions under which a colored product is
sold."172 Since lighting conditions can vary depending on the type
of store, time of day, and latitude of the selling area, replicating
'
1 See Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1302 ("We recognize that there are countless shades of colors
... but then, we could well become involved in 'shade confusion.' "); NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt
Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983 (1991) ("[Ilnfringement
actions could soon degenerate into questions of shade confusion.").
167 See MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 7.16 (arguing that "the ordinary person can probably
distinguish only a few basic primary colors."); S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (stating that one purpose of Lanham Act was
"to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
wants to get.").
16 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1305 (1995).
1Id.
170 See supra text accompanying note 41.
... Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 1300 (1995).172ld.
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lighting, while necessary to make a valid determination, will cause
difficulties for the lower courts.
Justice Breyer held that the functionality doctrine will prevent
color depletion from occurring, but he then set a high burden that
effectively would allow most colors to receive protection. 173  The
Court also noted that some colors are undesirable or are not usable
which causes the supply of colors to be depleted even more.174 As
the number of available colors becomes depleted, particularly in
some industries, competitors will be deterred from entering the
market. 175
Additionally, color should not receive trademark protection
because of the powerful psychological effect colors may have on
individuals. 176  Since people are not aware of the influence color
has upon them, it is even more harmful to grant exclusive use of a
color to only one manufacturer.
77
"People have marked preferences for certain colors while other
colors are less appreciated." 78 Some preferences result from
traditionally symbolic associations, such as "the use of black to
symbolize evil and wickedness and white to symbolize goodness and
173 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1306 (1995) (stating that test of
functionality is whether "a color serves a significant nontrademark function").
174 Id. at 4229-30.
171 See R.L. Winston Rod Co. v. Sage Mfg. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D.Mont. 1993)
(holding that "granting exclusive use of a color... would severely restrict competition; there
would be little left for the rest of the world."); Summerfield, supra note 39, at 996-97
(discussing other industries with limited range of colors available); see also Qualitex, 115 S.
Ct. 1300, 1306-07 (1995) (acknowledging shades similar to protected color will be unavailable
for use by competitors).
176 E.g., JEAN-PAUL FAVRE, COLOR SELLS YOUR PACKAGE 13 (1969) (discussing
psychological effects of color); CHESKIN, supra note 154, at 55 (stating that color has
"inherent psychological power"); see James Parton, Foreword to HOWARD KETCHAM, COLOR
PLANNING FOR BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY xi-xii (1958) ("Knute Rockne kept his gridmen keyed
up during the half in a red dressing room, while the visiting team was lulled with a soporific
blue.").
177 See CHESKIN, supra note 154, at 35-36 (stating that color affects people without
consciousness of effects); DEBORAH T. SHARPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COLOR AND DESIGN 51
(1974) (finding people may have "an innate or biologically mandated response to various
colors").
178 FAVRE, supra note 176, at 21; see Lynn M. Walsh et al., Color Preference and Food
Choice Among Children, 124 J. PSYCHOL., 645, 650 (1990) (stating that "nearly half... of the
children could give no reason beyond personal preference for their choices"); see also SHARPE,
supra note 177, at 3 (noting that color preferences were documented by research as early as
1894).
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purity."79 Also, color preferences are influenced by demographic
factors, such as gender, race, and socioeconomic class.' s
The color of a product or its packaging can have a significant
effect on sales.'' Color and its psychological effects can create
consumer interest in a product.'82 As a result of color's impor-
tance in marketing, manufacturers try to choose colors with
"maximum psychological appeal," that are "symbolic of the contents
of the package and have highest visibility."1 3 It is not enough to
select a color, but the right shade or tint needs to be chosen to
attract the most customers.184
In addition to attracting customers to a product, package color
can serve other functions. The color of a product can communicate
the product's use to the consumer.' s Manufacturers often use
color to "characterize the different products of the same firm."8 6
Certain colors have become so connected with a particular product
' SHARPE, supra note 177, at 47; see Eric M. Karp & H. B. Karp, Color Associations of
Male and Female Fourth-Grade School Children, 122 J. PSYCHOL., 383, 388 (1988) (finding
that children of both genders associated same emotions with traditionally symbolic colors);
Randall Lane, Does Orange Mean Cheap?, FORBES, Dec. 23, 1991, at 146 (discussing how
Ford Motor Company's use of different shades of red to target buyers by gender).
" E.g., SHARPE, supra note 177, at 51 (finding that research shows "definite cultural and
racial differences" in effects of color); Karp, supra note 179, at 388 ("The neutral stimuli
which had no symbolic colors attached evoked responses that significantly distinguished
between the sexes."); CHESIUN, supra note 176, at 73 (stating that socioeconomic class
influenced color preferences); Robert G. Smith, Color as a Marketing Tool, COLOR RES. AND
APPLICATION, Summer 1979, at 78 (arguing that "our culture, traditions, nationality, mood,
and income" affect how color is perceived).
181 See FAVRE, supra note 176, at 27 ("[Color] stamps itself better than any other factor
in our memory and makes the package more easily recognizable"); Lane, supra note 179, at
144 (discussing fifteen percent increase in sales when Igloo changed color of coolers).
18E.g., CHESKIN, supra note 154, at 213 (listing functions color performs in advertising);
Seonsu Lee & James H. Barnes, Jr., Using Color Preferences in Magazine Advertising, J.
ADVERTISING RES., Dec. 1989 - Jan. 1990, at 25 (stating that color "attract[s] attention"); see
KETCHAM, supra note 176, at 74 (discussing how color sells products).
183 CHESKIN, supra note 154, at 180.
1
' E.g., id. at 184-85 ("One kind of red may succeed where another shade or tint of red
will fail."). See also KETCHAM, supra note 176, at 76 (discussing psychological associations
resulting from different shades of colors).
185 See FAVRE, supra note 176, at 62 (discussing how selecting wrong color will suggest
different type of product to consumers); Lane, supra note 179, at 145 (stating that vitamin
manufacturer changed colors of package when consumers mistook yellow label with black
and white lettering for ant poison).
"8 E.g., FAVRE, supra note 176, at 89 (giving example of kinds of shampoo).
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that marketers find it hard not to use the traditional color
scheme." 7 Also, the color of a package may have been chosen to
protect the product from the harmful effects of light."s  The
manufacturer also considers the combination of colors for lettering
and background to find the most legible and attractive result."9
Finally, in selecting packaging color, the conditions in which the
product will be displayed and handled are important.19°
Due to the influence of product color on sales, companies are
spending more time and money researching what colors will be the
most successful.' 9' Since "[m]arketers will use whatever tools
they think might give them a slight edge,"'92 colors should not
receive trademark protection because a particular color that is
psychologically attractive can give a manufacturer a competitive
advantage.
The Court suggested that the psychological appeal of a product's
color could make the color functional.'93 Color, through its
attractiveness to consumers on a psychological level, can affect the
"cost or quality of the product" or even be regarded as "essential to
a product's use or purpose," but showing that this functionality is
"" Ronald Alsop, Color Grows More Important in Catching Consumers' Eyes, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 29, 1984, at 38 ("It's unwise to sell whole milk in anything but a red carton. And
thanks to McDonald's, many consumers don't believe a restaurant serves fast food if its signs
don't have a smidgen of red and yellow.").
'" E.g., FAVRE, supra note 176, at 88-89 (explaining that bottles are colored green and
brown to filter light rays that would harm beer).
9 See KETCHAM, supra note 176, at 78-79 (stating that colors should be chosen so that
writing can be read from distance); FAVRE, supra note 176, at 48-53 (demonstrating legibility
of various color combinations).
190 See Smith, supra note 180, at 78 (arguing that lighting conditions and circumstances
of sale influence how color of product is perceived); KETCHAM, supra note 176, at 77-78
(discussing how white colored packages become discolored from handling by consumers and
consequently are not saleable).
'9' Carroll M. Gantz, Mass-Market Color Selection, COLOR RES. AND APPLICATION, Fall
1978, at 13740 (explaining how selection of product colors is objective and lengthy process);
Lane, supra note 179, at 144 (stating that selection of colors is frequently done by well-paid
color consultant).
'2 Lane, supra note 179, at 146.
's Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995) ("sometimes color
plays an important role.., in making a product more desirable"...").
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significant may be impossible for many products.194 For this
reason, the traditional rule barring trademarks of colors should
have been retained.
Finally, policy arguments require a per se rule of no protection
for color. One of the basic principles underlying American law is
the "promotion and encouragement of competition."'95 Trade-
marks are an exception to the policy of free competition, granted to
prevent "confusion, mistake and deception in commerce," as well as
benefit the manufacturer.' However, the pervasive fear of
monopolies limits the extent of any grant of an exclusive right.'97
Thus, granting protection to a color alone "create[s] a barrier to
otherwise lawful competition."
9 8
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court erred in holding that color can receive
trademark protection. The Court should have upheld the tradition-
al bar on protection for color that was asserted in the Ninth Circuit
decision. Congress needs to revisit the issue and amend the
Lanham Act to expressly bar trademark protection for color alone.
Arguments in favor of continuing the prohibition on color
trademarks include the color depletion theory, the shade confusion
theory, the functionality doctrine, the availability of other remedies,
the psychological effects of color, and the American emphasis on
free competition.
The Court's holding in Qualitex sweeps too broadly and leaves
lower courts with the responsibility for answering unresolved
questions. Under the new rule, companies can easily register
colors. A higher standard should have been required because of the
need for colors in industry, the psychological impact of color, and
"' Id. Note that six days after announcing the Qualitex decision, the Court declined to
review a Federal Circuit case holding that aesthetically functional color could not receive
trademark protection. Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995).
19 McCARTHY, supra note 27, § 1.01(1).
196 Id. at § 1.01(2).
197 Id.
* In re Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Bissell,
J., dissenting). But see North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., __ U.S.T. -, 32 I.L.M. 605, 672 (including color in definitions of trademark).
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the longstanding tradition of denial of color protection. Although
the first cases under the Qualitex rule may be easy, the problems
of shade confusion and color depletion will likely clog the courts.
The Court truly has created a monster.
ELIZABETH A. OVERCAMP
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